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Abstract
This Note will give an overview of the development, operation and enforcement of FARA. It
will then discuss the INAC case and the confusion it is likely to cause among voluntary groups
as to their duty to register under FARA. This Note will also discuss how the INAC informative
purposes standard will exacerbate current problems in administering FARA. Lastly, this Note will
recommend that the INAC standard not be followed.
THE FOREIGN AGENTS
REGISTRATION ACT: A NEW STANDARD FOR
DETERMINING AGENCY
INTRODUCTION
The Foreign Agents Registration Act' (FARA) was enacted in
1938 to control subversive activities and propaganda dissemination
2
by Nazi and Communist agents in the United States.3 FARA's scope
has since been expanded 4 and now requires representatives of vari-
ous types of foreign entities to register with the Attorney General of
the United States even though their activities do not directly
threaten national security.5 Today, it provides the government with
1. 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621 (1976). The statute requires certain representatives of foreign
principals to register with the Attorney General and disclose all their information regarding
their activities in the United States. See injra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
2. H.R. REP. No. 1381, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1937) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE
REPORT]. The Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives explained the
purpose of FARA in the following statement:
Incontrovertible evidence has been submitted to prove that there are many
persons in the United States representing foreign governments or foreign political
groups, who are supplied by such foreign agencies with funds and other materials to
foster un-American activities, and to influence the external and internal policies of
this country, thereby violating both the letter and the spirit of international
law ....
As a result of such evidence, this bill was introduced, the purpose of which is to
require all persons who are in the United States for political propaganda pur-
poses . . . to register with the State Department and to supply information about
their political propaganda activities, their employers, and the terms of their con-
tracts. This required registration will publicize the nature of subversive or other
similar activities. . . so that the American people may know those who are engaged
in this country by foreign agencies to spread doctrines alien to our democratic form
of government, or propaganda for the purpose of influencing American public
opinion on a political question.
Id.
3. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 87TH CONG., 2D SEss., A PRELIMI-
NARY STUDY ON THE NONDIPLOMATIC AcrIVITIES OF REPRESENTATIVES OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
6 (Comm. Print 1962) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
4. Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-486, 80 Stat. 244 (1966) (codified as amended at
22 U.S.C. § 611 (1976)).
5. In 1966, a series of amendments to FARA was proposed and passed by the Senate.
Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-486, 80 Stat. 244 (1966) (codified as amended at 22
U.S.C. § 611 (1976)). These amendments were to affect American agents representing
economic interests of foreign governments. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 611(b), (c) (1976). A
preliminary study prepared by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations indicated the
purpose of these amendments in the following statement:
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information on individuals in the United States who advance their
foreign principal's interests through "non-diplomatic" channels.,
FARA's coverage has been broadened further by Attorney
General of the United States v. Irish Northern Aid Committee7
(INAC), a recent case of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. In INAC, the Second Circuit created a new stand-
ard for the determination of the agency relationship under FARA. 8
The test introduced by INAC is whether the relationship between
the representative and the foreign interest warrants registration to
fulfill the "informative purposes" of FARA.9 Previously, the Resta-
tement of Agency 10 was used to define the agency relationship, and
control of the agent by the principal was a necessary element. " The
informative purposes standard broadens FARA's definition of
In recent years there has been an increasing number of incidents involving
attempts by foreign governments, or their agents, to influence the conduct of
American foreign policy by techniques outside normal diplomatic channels ....
. . . [M]any foreign governments with diplomatic representation in Washing-
ton retain public relations counselors, law firms, or private individuals to assist in
bringing particular foreign policy points of view to the attention of the U.S. govern-
ment ....
The purpose of examining foreign government lobbying is not to show that
these activities are necessarily wrong . . . . [I]t is believed that . . . the American
people [should obtain] a full and accurate picture of activity of this kind, particu-
larly since the tempo of such activity has increased in almost direct proportion to our
Government's growing political, military, and economic commitments abroad.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at v. As a result of this study by Committee Chairman Senator
Fulbright, FARA was amended in 1966. Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-486, 80 Stat. 244
(1966) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 611 (1976)). This amendment required not only
registration of agents representing foreign governments, but also provided coverage of agents
representing non-governmental interests. 22 U.S.C. § 611(b)(3) (1976).
6. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 1.
7. Attorney Gen. of the United States v. Irish N. Aid Comm., 668 F.2d 159 (2d Cir.
1982), af'g, 530 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The Attorney General sought to enjoin
defendant Irish Northern Aid Committee from violating certain registration and disclosure
requirements of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621 (1976).
The government sought injunctive relief to compel the Irish Northern Aid Committee to
register as an agent of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). 668 F.2d at 160. Plaintiffs motion
for summary judgment was granted by the district court. 530 F. Supp. at 267.
8. See infra notes 75-84.
9. 668 F.2d at 161.
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (1957).
11. The Restatement of Agency defines an agency relationship as the "fiduciary relation
which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall
act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1957). An agency relationship exists if "there is an understanding
between the parties which . . . creates a fiduciary relation in which the fiduciary is subject to
the directions of the one on whose account he acts." Id. § 1 comment b.
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agent 12 because, contrary to the Restatement standard, it does not
look to control as a determinative element in establishing agency. 
13
This Note will give an overview of the development, operation
and enforcement of FARA.14 It will then discuss the INAC case1
5
and the confusion it is likely to cause among voluntary groups as to
their duty to register under FARA.' 6 This Note will also discuss how
the INAC informative purposes standard will exacerbate current
problems in administering FARA.' 7 Lastly, this Note will recom-
mend that the INAC standard not be followed.' 8
I. THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT
A. Historical Development of FARA
FARA was promulgated in 1938 as a legislative response to the
increasing use of propaganda in the United States by agents of
foreign governments.' 9 Congress believed that national security
made it necessary for the government to obtain knowledge of these
activities through the registration and disclosure mandates of
FARA.20 Under FARA, foreign agents were required to register
with and disclose to the government 2' their activities and the identi-
ties of their foreign principals.22 Agents whose principals were for-
eign governments or political parties constituted the first category
to come within the scope of FARA.23
12. 22 U.S.C. § 611(c) (1966).
13. 688 F.2d at 161.
14. See injra notes 19-39 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 56-84 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
19. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 6.
20. HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. It was Congress' belief that the registration and
disclosure mandates of FARA were a "spotlight of pitiless publicity [which] will serve as a
deterrent to the spread of pernicious propaganda." Id.. The purpose of FARA was to "force
propaganda agents representing foreign agencies to come out 'in the open' in their activities,
or to subject themselves to the penalties provided in said bill." Id. at 3. For a detailed
discussion on FARA's registration and disclosure requirements, see infra notes 31-39 and
accompanying text.
21. Prior to 1942, registration and supervisory functions were performed by the Secre-
tary of State. These functions are now under the authority of the Attorney General and the
Justice Department. Exec. Order No. 9176, 3 C.F.R. 1165 (1942).
22. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 7.
23. 22 U.S.C. § 611(b)(1) (1976).
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With the emergence of the United States as the political and
commercial focal point of the western world after World War 11,24
foreign governments and private enterprises have developed a stake
in this nation's foreign and domestic policies. 25 As a result, foreign
principals have hired political consultants, public relations firms
and attorneys to lobby for their economic and political interests. 26
The 1966 FARA amendments 27 broadened FARA's coverage to
include as agents those persons who seek to influence legislators and
American public opinion by lobbying for economic and political
interests of foreign entities. 28 In many countries, business enter-
prises are controlled or operated by the government. 29 Therefore,
the 1966 amendment included in FARA those who promote the
interests not only of foreign governments but also of foreign enter-
prises which are closely connected to a foreign government. 30
Pursuant to FARA, agents of foreign principals must file with
the Attorney General a detailed registration statement within ten
24. Since World War II, the United States has become the center of attention for
political and economic affairs of the world. The policies of the United States have tremendous
impact upon many nations. Therefore, many foreign governments hire American individuals
to lobby for their interests. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at v. The Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations found in 1962 that such "nondiplomatic" lobbying activities have "in-
creased in almost direct proportion to our Government's growing political, military, and
economic commitments abroad." Id. For an excellent discussion on the 1966 amendment
process, see Note, Foreign Agents Registration Act: Proposed Amendments, 40 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 311 (1965).
25. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at v. Private enterprises are affected by United
States policies in that, for instance, any high import tariff imposed by the United States might
hinder an importing country's profit margin.
26. Id.
27. See Note, supra note 24, at 311-14.
28. 22 U.S.C § 611(b) (1976). Under § 611, a "foreign principal" could be either a
"person outside of the United States," id. § 611(b)(2), "a partnership, association, corpora-
tion, organization or other combination of persons organized under the laws of or having its
principal place of business in a foreign country." Id. § 611(b)(3). Therefore, an agent of a
private foreign corporation engaging in political activities is required to register under FARA.
Id. § 611(c)(1)(iv).
29. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 1. In "newly developing" and "controversial"
countries, industrial and financial entities are owned by the governments. Id. See generally
Rabinowitz v. Kennedy, 376 U.S. 605 (1964) (attorneys representing Banco Nacional de
Cuba, a bank operated by the communist Cuban government, were required to register
under FARA).
30. 22 U.S.C. § 611(b) (1976). Under the broad definition of "foreign principal" as
provided in § 611, a government-related business enterprise would still be considered a
"foreign principal." Id. § 611(b)(1), (3).
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days 31 of becoming an agent, 32 unless their status falls within one of
the statutory exemptions. 33 The registration statement requires dis-
closure of information regarding the identity and status of the agent
himself and of his principal, 34 the nature of his activities, 35 and all
relevant financial and contractual agreements reached between the
agent and his foreign principal. 31 In addition, the Attorney General
may inspect the books and records of the foreign agent. 37 A person
who willfully violates any registration or disclosure requirement is
subject to a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not
more than five years, or both.38 The Attorney General may request
31. Id. § 612(a).
32. The term an "agent of a foreign principal" is defined in § 611 of FARA. Id. § 611(c).
33. Under § 613 of FARA, certain individuals and organizations are exempt from
FARA. 22 U.S.C. § 613 (1976). There are basically four groups of agents whose activities
exempt them from FARA's disclosure and registration requirements. They are diplomatic or
consular officers, id. § 613(a), officials of foreign government, id. § 613(b), persons engaging
in activities promoting commercial interest of a foreign principal, id. § 613(d), persons
engaging in activities in furtherance of bona fide pursuits that are scholastic or scientific, id. §
613(e), and certain persons qualified to practice law, provided that their activities are non-
political, id. § 611(g). Attorneys representing foreign governments before United States
agencies or officials are not exempt by § 613(g) and therefore must register. This section was
amended after Rabinowitz v. Kennedy, 318 F.2d 181, 182 (D.C. Cir. 1963), afj'd, 376 U.S.
605, 610 (1964). In that case, Attorney General Kennedy sought the registration of the
attorneys representing Banco Nacional de Cuba. 376 U.S. at 606. In an action for a declara-
tory judgment, the attorneys for Banco Nacional claimed that they were exempt under §
613(g) in that their activities were limited to litigation "involving the mercantile and finan-
cial interests of the Republic of Cuba." Id. The Supreme Court held that a foreign govern-
ment's commercial interest being adjudicated in litigation could be deemed "financial or
mercantile" but could not be deemed "private and non-political" within the meaning of §
613(g). Id. at 609-10. Thus lawyers representing a foreign government's commercial interests
in litigation must register under FARA. See id.
In response to the Rabinowitz ruling, Congress in 1966 amended § 613(g) by deleting the
phrase "financial or mercantile." See Note, supra note 24, at 319-20. The Rabinowitz
decision created confusion among attorneys with foreign private or governmental clients as to
their registration requirements. Id. at 320. The decision could be interpreted as requiring
only attorneys representing hostile governments, such as Cuba, to register, or as requiring all
attorneys representing foreign governments to register. Id.
34. 22 U.S.C. § 612 (1976). This detailed statement must be updated by a supplemental
statement filed every six months. Id. § 612(b).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 22 U.S.C. § 615 (1976). Section 615 states that the Attorney General, "having due
regard for the national security and the public interest," may open the books and records of a
foreign agent. Id. For a detailed discussion on how this provision may impinge upon the
attorney-client privilege, see Attorney Gen. of the United States v. Covington & Burling, 411
F. Supp. 371 (D.D.C. 1976). See injra note 103.
38. 22 U.S.C § 618 (1976).
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from an appropriate district court temporary or permanent injunc-
tive relief. 39
Agents of foreign principals have the duty to fulfill FARA's
requirements if they engage in political activities, whether they be
propaganda dissemination 40 or lobbying for economic and political
interests. 4' More importantly, prior to INAC only those who had a
legally binding agency relationship with their foreign principals
were required to register as agents under FARA. 42
B. Traditional Interpretation of Agency
To trigger the registration requirement under FARA, an
agency relationship must exist between an American representative
and a foreign interest. 43 Under FARA, an agent is defined as "any
person who acts as an agent, representative, employee, or servant,
or any person who acts in any other capacity at the order, request,
or under the direction or control of a foreign principal. ' 44 One case,
United States v. German-American Vocational League45 (German-
39. 22 U.S.C § 618(f) (1976). The provision for injunctive relief was promulgated
during the 1966 amendment process. Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-486, § 7, 80 Stat.
244, 248 (1966) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 618(f) (1976)). Section 618 states that:
[Tihe Attorney General may make application to the appropriate United States
district court for an order enjoining such acts or enjoining [an unregistered agent of
a foreign principal] ...from continuing to act as an agent of such foreign princi-
pal, or for an order requiring compliance with any appropriate provision of the
subchapter or regulation thereunder. The district court shall have jurisdiction and
authority to issue a temporary or permanent injunction, restraining order or such
other order which it may deem proper. The proceedings shall be made a preferred
cause and shall be expedited in every way.
Id.
40. See 22 U.S.C. § 612(a); 2 U.S.C. § 611(o).
41. See 22 U.S.C. § 612(a); 2 U.S.C. § 611(o), (q).
42. See United States v. German-American Vocational League, 153 F.2d 860 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 760 (1946). For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 45-55 and
accompanying text.
43. The need to establish the existence of control before finding an agency relationship
was specifically expressed in the 1966 amendment process. HousE COMM. ON TIrE JUDIcIARY,
FOPRIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT AMENDMENTS, H.R. REP. No. 1470, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
5-6 (1966). The committee on the Judiciary stated that "the Justice Department must
establish as a first step in requiring registration that an agency relationship exists." Id.
44. 22 U.S.C. § 611(c) (1976).
45. 153 F.2d 860 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 760 (1946). This is the only case in
which the meaning of agency was adjudicated. Most FARA cases involve defendants who
admitted that an agency relationship existed between them and a foreign principal, but
litigated on issues of exemption status and disclosure requirements. See, e.g., Rabinowitz v.
Kennedy, 376 U.S. 605 (1964) (discussed supra note 33); Attorney Gen. of the United States
v. Covington & Burling, 411 F. Supp. 371 (D.C.C. 1976) (discussed infra note 102).
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT
American), interpreted the meaning of the agency relationship un-
der FARA. The defendant organization in that case was an organi-
zation of German-Americans which sought to introduce Nazi
propaganda into the United States during the 1940's.46 To avoid
FARA's registration and disclosure requirements, the officers of the
organization conspired among themselves to disguise the organiza-
tion as a social and fraternal club. 47
The German-American court applied the Restatement stand-
ard to determine the existence of agency under FARA. 48 The Resta-
tement defines an agent as one who "act[s] on ...[the principal's]
behalf and subject to . .. [the principal's] control." 49 Similarly,
FARA defines an agent as one "who acts. . . at the order, request,
or under the direction or control, of a foreign principal." 50 There-
fore, FARA's statutory definition of agency resembles closely the
Restatement definition., 1 Both are based on the determinative crite-
rion of control. 52 Because of the similarity of the language5 3 and the
lack of any legislative history indicating that a different type of
agency was intended by Congress, 54 the German-American court
46. 153 F.2d at 862.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 864.
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1957).
50. 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1) (1976). A person or or an organization is an agent of a foreign
principal if his activities are "indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsi-
dized in whole or in major part by a foreign principal." Id. Such individual or organization is
deemed a foreign agent if he "agrees, consents, assumes or purports to act as, or who is or
holds himself out to ...[others as a representative of a foreign interest], whether or not
pursuant to contractual relationship." Id. § 611(c)(2).
51. See supra note 48. The Restatement of Agency defines agency as a relationship
"which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall
act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1957). Similarly, FARA defines an "agent" as one who "acts in any
...capacity at the order, request, or under the direction or control of a foreign principal."
22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1) (1976).
52. As defined in the Restatement, control is present when the agent is "subject to the
directions" of his principal. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 comment b (1957).
Control is a "continuous subjection to the will of the principal." Id. Control may be exercised
by the principal "prescribing what the agent shall or shall not do before the agent acts, or at
the time when he acts, or at both times." Id. § 14 comment a.
53. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 212 (1957). It states that:
A person is subject to liability for the consequences of another's conduct which
results from his directions as he would be for his own personal conduct if, with
knowledge of the conditions, he intends the conduct, or if he intends its conse-
quences, unless the one directing or the one acting has a privilege or immunity not
available to the other.
1983]
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used the Restatement standard and found that the German-Ameri-
can Vocational League was in fact an agent of the German Reich. 55
II. INTERPRETATION OF AGENCY UNDER INAC
As a result of the recent INAC decision, 5 uncertainty has been
created among voluntary groups regarding their duty to fulfill
FARA's registration and disclosure requirements. In INAC, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
district court's summary judgment compelling the Irish Northern
Aid Committee to register under FARA as an agent of the IRA. 57 In
affirming the district court opinion, the circuit court was not con-
cerned with imposing liability upon a foreign principal. 58 Rather,
the court affirmed by reasoning that the "relationship warrants
registration by the agent to carry out the informative purposes" of
FARA.59 This ruling was made without first establishing that the
IRA in fact had control over defendant Irish Northern Aid Commit-
tee. 60
A. District Court Opinion
Since 1971, the Irish Northern Aid Committee has been regis-
tered under FARA as a group of individuals that voluntarily sends
money and aid to the Northern Aid Committee in Northern Ire-
Congress was aware of and intended to keep the element of control when it enacted
FARA to impose liability upon a foreign principal. Another disclosure-type statute, the
Voorhis Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2381-2391 (1976), also focuses on the element of control in
defining an agency relationship. In the Voorhis Act, an organization "subject to foreign
control" is required to register with the Attorney General under the statute for the purposes of
controlling subversive activities such as treason and sedition. 18 U.S.C. § 2386(A)(a) (1976).
Since both FARA and the Voorhis Act specifically included the element of control in defining
an agency relationship, it appears that Congress did not intend to create a different type of
agency relationship when it enacted FARA.
55. 153 F.2d at 864.
56. 530 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aJ'd per curiam, 668 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1982).
See also supra note 7.
57. 668 F.2d at 160. In a per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed the district court's opinion that defendant "is the 'agent' of the IRA within
the meaning of [FARA]." Id.
58. Id. at 161.
59. Id.
60. Id. The court stated: "We agree that the agency relationship sufficient to require
registration need not, as INAC urges, meet the standard of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency with its focus on 'control' of the agent by the principal." Id. (footnote omitted).
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land. 6 ' The members of the Irish Northern Aid Committee have a
common concern: an independent "Republican Movement" in
Northern Ireland. 2 An action against the defendant was initiated
by the Attorney General who complained that the defendant had
failed to meet FARA's requirements by not registering as the agent
of the IRA.6 3 The Attorney General sought injunctive relief compel-
ling compliance with FARA. 4 In its answer, defendant claimed it
was not an agent of the IRA but a representative of the Northern
Aid Committee located in Belfast, Ireland.6 5 It argued that it acted
only voluntarily in sending aid and money to the Northern Aid
Committee,6 6 without subjecting itself to the control of the Irish
Republican Army.6 7
The district court rejected defendant's "control" argument and
granted summary judgment compelling defendant to register as an
agent of the IRA.6 8 Exhibits supporting the Attorney General's
motion for summary judgment showed that the IRA had requested
that defendant provide financial and emotional support for the
"Republican Movement." ' The district court strictly construed
FARA's definition of agency and held that defendant was an agent
of the IRA because it acted at the "order, request, or under the
direction or control" 70 of the IRA. 7' The use of the disjunctive "or"
in the statutory definition, the court reasoned, was dispositive of
Congress' intent to include those representatives who merely act
upon the "request" of a foreign interest. 72 Therefore, the district
61. 530 F. Supp. 241, 245.
62. See generally id. at 258 (the Republican Movement authorized the Irish Northern
Aid Committee to collect funds and aids to send to Northern Ireland). In its registration
statement, defendant organization "described itself as a 'voluntary group who collect what
money and clothing we can and send it on for use by the oppressed people' of Northern
Ireland." Id. at 245.
63. 530 F. Supp. at 246-47. Defendant organization claimed that the complaint filed
constituted selective enforcement of FARA because the government was hostile towards
defendant's beliefs. Id. at 253.
64. Id. at 245. For a discussion of FARA's injunctive relief provision, see supra note 39.
65. 530 F. Supp. at 245-48.
66. Id. at 245. The Irish Northern Aid Committee is an "unincorporated association"
having its office in the Bronx, New York. Id.
67. Id. at 256. Defendant argued that control should be the determinative factor in
finding an agency relationship under FARA. Id.
68. Id. at 256, 267.
69. Id. at 257-58.
70. 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1) (1976).
71. 530 F. Supp. at 257.
72. Id. at 256-57. The court noted that:
In the case at bar, there is no indication that the disjunctive "or" means anything
19831
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court did not apply the Restatement standard, as set forth in Ger-
man-American,7 3 and held that there was an agency relationship
between the Irish Northern Aid Committee and the Irish Republi-
can Army. 4
B. Circuit Court Decision
The circuit court affirmed the district court's ruling.75 In af-
firming the district court decision, the circuit court was not con-
cerned with the liability aspect posed by the traditional "control"
standard of agency; 76 the court did not consider the issue of whether
but what it says. Acordingly, it is not necessary for plaintiff to prove that defendant
is an "agent," in the Restatement sense, or a "person who acts in any other capacity
• . . under the direction or control" of the IRA; it is sufficient to establish agency
under the Act that defendant is a "representative" of the IRA, or acts at its "re-
quest."
Id. at 257 (footnote omitted).
73. 153 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1946). See supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text for a
discussion of German-American.
74. 530 F. Supp. at 256-57. Shortly prior to the circuit court's decision, the Department
of Justice stated its enforcement policy before the Special Committee on Investigations of the
Senate Judiciary Committee on Individuals Representing Interests of Foreign Governments.
Assistant Attorney General, Phillip B. Heymann, testified:
As we read [FARA] . . . a person is a foreign agent, and must register with the
Department, if he engages in the activities specified in the statute and if he does so at
the order of a foreign principal, or under the direction or control of a foreign
principal. What this language emphasizes is that the relationship between the agent
and the foreign principal must be one that substantially obligates the agent to the
foreign principal. Only then is it fair to draw the conclusion that an individual is not
acting independently, is not simply stating his or her own views, but is acting as an
agent or alter ego of the foreign principal.
[ .. FARA] defines a foreign agent as anyone who acts . . . at the "order,
request, or under the direction or control" of a foreign principal. The critical
language is "order, request, or under the direction or control." If we broadly
construed the word "request" to include all forms of argument or persuasion, it
would be totally out of line with the other terms "agent," "order, " and "direction
and control. " It would also cause some unintended results.
Inquiry into the Matter of Billy Carter and Libya: Hearings before the Subcomm. to
Investigate the Activities of Individuals Representing the Interests of Foreign Governments,
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 700-01 (1980) (statement of Phillip B.
Heymann, Assitant Attorney General) (emphasis added). In affirming the district court's
decision, the circuit court did not consider the admission by the Department of Justice as to
its own enforcement policy of FARA. The court held that defendant was the agent of the
IRA, without finding that defendant was under its control. 668 F.2d at 160-61.
75. 668 F.2d at 160.
76. Id. at 161.
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liability could be imposed upon a foreign principal. 77 The court was
troubled by the broad district court ruling, however, because such
strict construction of FARA would require all voluntary relief
groups to register, including those groups that "Congress did not
intend to regulate. '78 Therefore, the circuit court reasoned that
registration is not required unless the relationship between the
foreign interest and the representative is such that registration is
necessary to fulfill the informative purposes of FARA. 7
9
The circuit court qualified its informative purposes standard
by stating that not all voluntary groups acting upon a "plea" from a
foreign government are considered foreign agents under FARA.
80
The court stated that large groups of Americans which respond to
"pleas" for aid from a foreign government in emergency situations
are not foreign agents under FARA.8 ' The court noted, however,
that when a limited group of individuals acts upon the "request" of
a foreign government, the group may be required to register as an
agent . 2 Therefore, a "request" falls somewhere between a "plea"
and a "command. ' 83 The surrounding circumstances, the court
stated, would indicate to the recipient of a "request" whether regis-
tration is warranted to serve the informative purposes of FARA.
84
III. CRITIQUE OF INAC
In view of the district court's strict construction of the statu-
tory definition of agency 85 and the circuit court's informative pur-
poses standard for determining agency, 86 the Third Circuit's en-
dorsement of the Restatement standard for agency as set forth in
German-American87 was not followed by INAC.88 This creates a
77. Id.
78. Id. (footnote omitted).
79. Id. Although the INAC court did not explain what the "informative purposes" of
FARA were, it could nonetheless be inferred from the legislative history of FARA that the
"informative purposes" referred to information of foreign political activities conducted in the
United States. See supra notes 2, 5 and accompanying text.
80. 668 F.2d at 161-62.




85. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
87. 153 F.2d 860 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 760 (1946). See supra notes 45-48, 55
and accompanying text for a discussion of German-American.
88. 668 F.2d at 161.
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conflict between the Second Circuit and the Third Circuit as to
which agency standard should be employed for the purposes of
determining an agency under FARA.
The Restatement standard should be retained as the only
standard for the purposes of FARA because the INAC informative
purposes standard for determining agency is overly broad and am-
biguous. 89 The INAC standard creates uncertainty for those who
have to register under FARA,90 and burdensome workloads for
those charged with administering and enforcing FARA.9' The am-
biguity inherent in the INAC agency standard causes uncertainty
among foreign representatives as to their duty to register.92
A. General Criticisms of INAC's Agency Standard
1. Effects of INAC's Broad Interpretation
The informative purposes standard for agency is overly encom-
passing in that an agency may be found despite the fact that there is
no legally binding relationship between the American representa-
tive and the foreign interest.9 3 Consequently, after INAC the num-
ber of foreign representatives required to register under FARA will
probably be greatly increased. INAC's broad agency standard will
exacerbate the current administrative problems for the Justice De-
partment. As of 1979, more than 6,000 individuals filed short-form
registration statements.9 4 Most of these registrants are representa-
tives of foreign business interests. 5 It is estimated that among lob-
bying groups only about thirty percent provided adequate disclo-
89. See infra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
90. See infra text accompanying notes 100-03.
91. See infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
93. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1957). Under the Restatement of
Agency, the criterion of control is important in an ageny relationship because it renders the
relationship legally binding. See also supra note 51 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the similarities between the Restatement and FARA definitions of agency.
94 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO THE CONGRESS OF THE
UNITED STATES ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT OF 1938,
AS AMENDED, FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1977, at 2 (1979). "Short-form statements are filed for
individuals working on a foreign principal's behalf in the employ of a long-form (usually
organizational) registrant foreign agent." Pattison & Taylor, Legislating Away the Mask: A
Guide to the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 5 DIST. LAW., Nov.-Dec. 1980, at 39, 65 n.5.
95. Pattison & Taylor, supra note 94, at 42.
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sure."6 The increasing number of foreign entities engaging in
political activities in the United States may generate a heavy work-
load for the Justice Department in its administration and enforce-
ment of FARA. Because the INAC agency standard is broader than
the Restatement standard,9 7 the current problems of administration
and enforcement will predictably be made worse if the INAC
standard is applied. 8
By enlarging FARA's coverage to include those relationships
that cannot be considered genuine agency under the Restatement
standard,"" the INAC interpretation of agency also imposes a bur-
den upon those who represent legitimate foreign interests. 100 Under
section 615 of FARA, books and records of agents are subject to
96. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN THE ADMIN-
ISTRATION OF FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION, enclosure I at 2 (1980).
97. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
98. See Note, supra note 24, at 313; Note, Attorneys, Propagandists, Internanational
Business: A Comment on the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, 3 GA. J. INT'L COMP.
L. 408, 421-22 (1973). In addition to testifying before a particular congressional committee, a
foreign agent may lobby for or against certain legislation by making campaign contributions
to favorable candidates on behalf of his foreign principal. See Note, supra note 24, at 421-22.
Two statutes, the Federal Election Campaigns Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1976 & Supp.
V 1981), and the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 261- 270 (1976), are more
effective in regulating lobbying activities than FARA. Under the Federal Election Campaigns
Act, every candidate receiving campaign contributions must disclose to the Federal Election
Commission the amount of contributions and the identity of the contributors. 2 U.S.C. §
432(c) (1976 Supp. V 1981) (requiring treasurer of a political committee to keep records); 2
U.S.C. § 434(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (requiring reports to be filed). The Federal Election
Campaigns Act's definition of a "person" does not distinguish between foreign and domestic
individuals and entities. 2 U.S.C. § 431(11) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). This Act therefore also
covers foreign contributors.
While the Election Campaigns Act keeps a watchful eye on election activities, the
Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-270 (1976), requires disclosure of
lobbying activities. Id. The Lobbying Act requires disclosure of relevant information every
three months. Id. § 264(a). The Lobbying Act seems more effective than FARA because it
provides more up to date information on lobbying activities.
FARA, the Election Campaigns Act and the Lobbying Act were promulgated to inform
the government of political activities which try to influence legislators. FARA covers political
activities which include "dissemination of political propaganda and any other activity ...
[intended to] ...influence any agency or official of the Government . . .with reference to
formulating, adopting, or changing the domestic or foreign policies of the United States." 22
U.S.C. § 611(o) (1976). FARA's impact is broader than the Election Campaigns Act and the
Lobbying Act because it also covers agents appearing before United States officials and
agencies to influence policy-making. Id. § 611(c)(1)(iv) & (o). The Election Campaigns Act
and the Lobbying Act, however, cover only those who influence members of Congress, 2
U.S.C. § 267(a) (1976), and congressional candidates, 2 U.S.C. § 432 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
99. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 26, 98 and accompanying text.
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inspection by the Attorney General.' 0' This provision allows the
Attorney General a means of acquiring relevant information for
enforcement of FARA. If no genuine agency relationship exists and
FARA is invoked to compel disclosure of confidential material, such
disclosure may constitute an impingement of the purported agent's
constitutionally protected rights of free speech,10 2 privacy, 03 or
association.
101. 2 U.S.C. § 615 (1976). See also supra note 37 and accompanying text for a detailed
discussion of § 615 of FARA.
102. To avoid impinging on an individual's right of free speech, FARA was designed not
to suppress propaganda, but to inform the American public of its propaganda sources. See
HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 2-3. The constitutionality of FARA was challenged in United
States v. Peace Information Center, 97 F. Supp. 255 (D.D.C. 1951). In this case, defendants
Peace Information Center and its officers were charged with violating FARA by failing to
register. Id. at 258. The institutional defendant claimed that FARA was unconstitutional
because it infringed its officers' first amendment right of free speech and their fifth amend-
ment right against self-incrimination. Id. at 262-63. The court readily rejected the argument,
stating:
The statute under consideration neither limits nor interferes with freedom of
speech. It does not regulate expression of ideas. Nor does it preclude the making of
any utterances. It merely requires persons carrying on certain activities to identify
themselves by filing a registration statement.
Moreover, the statute does not require the disclosure of any information except
on a voluntary basis as a condition of carrying on certain occupations or certain
activities. The information called for by the statute is not incriminating on its face.
Id. This decision reflects the court's deference to the legislative powers of Congress "to take
preventive measures against activities that may cause international misunderstandings . . . as
well as against endeavors to subvert, undermine, or overthrow the government." Id. at 261.
The Supreme Court of the United States has never reviewed the constitutionality of
FARA, although it has interpreted the meanings of certain of its provisions. See Rabinowitz
v. Kennedy, 376 U.S. 605 (1964) (discussed supra note 39). See also Viereck v. United States,
318 U.S. 236 (1943) (although defendant's activities were political, defendant did not have to
disclose activities conducted on his own behalf).
103. A recent case illustrates the problems of disclosing confidential material to the
government. In Attorney Gen. v. Covington & Burling, 411 F. Supp. 371 (D.D.C. 1976), the
defendant, a law firm, represented the Republic of Guinea before various agencies and courts
of law in litigations involving a series of contract disputes. Id. at 372. When the Attorney
General sought to inspect the law firm's records in connection with Guinea, the law firm
made available to the Attorney General only 95% of these records, claiming the other 5%
were confidential information protected by the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 372. Recog-
nizing the potential for governmental abuse if the privilege were found inapplicable in this
situation, the court held that the defendant could validly claim the attorney-client privilege.
However, the court left to its discretion to decide which documents out of the 5% were to be
disclosed to the government. Id. at 377. Where there is no attorney-client relationship the
Attorney General conceivably may request disclosure of records that are highly confidential.
See, e.g., Attorney Gen. of the United States v. Irish N. Aid Comm., 346 F. Supp. 1384
(S.D.N.Y.) (agent must disclose membership), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1080 (1972).
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In addition, because of the INAC ruling that the Restatement
of Agency's control criterion is not determinative, a person's reputa-
tion could be damaged if he were compelled to register as an agent
of an unpopular foreign entity.1
0 4
2. Effects of INAC's Ambiguous Agency Standard
The informative purposes standard10 5 for the determination of
agency is inherently ambiguous. The ambiguity lies in ascertaining
who has the responsibility of determining whether registration is
warranted to fulfill the informative purposes of FARA. 0 6 It is
unclear who must determine whether a certain "request" made by a
foreign interest falls between a "plea" and a "command."'10 7 Al-
though the INAC court did attempt to clarify the ambiguity by
stating that the surrounding circumstances will generally indicate
104. For example, a group of sympathetic individuals may voluntarily solicit and send
money and aid to their friends and relatives in a country unfriendly to the United States. If
the Attorney General is allowed to compel registration without establishing that a genuine
agency relationship exists, see supra notes 42-43, those individuals might be mistaken for
subversives in the eyes of the public.
A recent example is the Senate investigation into Billy Carter's trip to Libya. Billy
Carter's visit stirred much controversy and aroused public attention. See Pattison & Taylor,
supra note 94, at 39. The Senate investigation focused on whether Billy Carter was an
"agent" of Libya, a hostile country, and whether registration under FARA was required. See
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE INDIVIDUALS REPRESENTING
THE INTERESTS OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, INQUIRY INTO THE MATTER OF BILLY CARTER AND
LIBYA, S. REP. No. 96-1015, 96h Cong., 2d Sess (1980). See also supra note 74 for a statement
of the Justice Department's enforcement policy of FARA made during the investigation.
Conceivably, any private individuals having the slightest connection with a hostile
country might be subject to public inquiry. With mass media and press coverage, such
individuals may be perceived by the public as "agents" of unfriendly foreign governments.
The general public may mistake a "foreign agent" for someone conducting criminal activities
for a foreign government. Individuals labeled as "foreign agents" are likely to have their
personal and business reputations severely damaged.
105. 668 F.2d at 161. See also supra note 79 and accompanying text.
106. The Attorney General has the authority to administer and enforce FARA. See
supra notes 2, 21. Unless the dispute is adjudicated in a court of law, the Attorney General
seems to have much discretion in determining who must register to fulfill the "informative
purposes" of FARA. In addition to registration, an "agent" is subject to FARA's various
disclosure requirements. See supra note 37. This creates a precarious possibility of selective
enforcement by the Attorney General. Cf. Attorney Gen. of the United States v. Irish People,
Inc., 684 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (defendant newspaper company claimed that the
Attorney General's action constituted selective enforcement of FARA). See also 530 F. Supp.
241, 251-52 (Irish Northern Aid Committee claimed that prosecution was based upon the
Attorney General's hostility towards its beliefs).
107. 668 F.2d at 161.
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whether a person has a duty to register,' 0 8 it nonetheless provided
no definitive guidelines. Furthermore, FARA covers agents who
represent both foreign governments and foreign business enterprises
involved in political activities. 10 The INAC case involved a volun-
tary group representing a foreign political interest. 110 The court,
however, opened the door to further confusion by failing to indicate
whether the informative purposes standard applies equally to vol-
untary groups representing foreign commercial interests. As a
result, the informative purposes standard may be violative of an
individual's due process guarantees because the definition of an
agent is so vague that a person may not receive adequate notice of
his duty to comply with FARA's requirements."'
B. Proposal: The Restatement of Agency Standard
The district court's strict construction of the statutory defini-
tion of agent 2 and the circuit court's informative purposes stand-
108. Id. at 161-62.
109. For a discussion of who is an agent under FARA, see supra notes 21-30 and
accompanying text.
110. 530 F. Supp. at 245.
111. The "requirement of fair notice.., is included in the conception of 'due process of
law.' " Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 524 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). As a
constitutional limitation, due process requires a criminal statute to be precise so that it
provides a "person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is
forbidden by the statute." United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1953). Harriss also sets
forth the due process principle that "no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct
which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed." Id. FARA has both criminal
and civil sanctions. 22 U.S.C. § 618 (1976). See also supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
The vagueness of INAC's informative purposes standard for agency might not provide notice
to those individuals acting upon the request of a foreign interest that registration is required
in order to avoid sanctions. See supra text accompanying notes 80-84.
A precarious effect of a vague statute is the "unfettered discretion it places in the hands"
of the enforcement authority. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 168 (1972). Where
no definite standard of enforcement exists, the statute has the adverse effect of providing
"arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law." Id. at 170. Conceivably, the INAC
informative purposes standard will open the door for the Attorney General to use wide
discretion in enforcing FARA. A claim to that effect has been made in Attorney Gen. of the
United States v. Irish People, Inc., 684 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The defendant newspaper
company claimed that the Attorney General's enforcement of FARA constituted selective
prosecution. Id. at 931. This case was decided after the Irish Northern Aid Committee was
ordered to register as an agent of the IRA. 668 F.2d 159, 160 (2d Cir. 1982). Because The
Irish People, Inc. is controlled and operated by the Irish Northern Aid Committee, and
because of a lack of evidence showing that prosecution was improperly motivated, The Irish
People, Inc. was ordered to comply with FARA's registration and disclosure requirements.
684 F.2d at 930-31. This recent case illustrates that the informative purposes standard might
provide arbitrary and improper enforcement of FARA.
112. 530 F. Supp. at 255-57. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
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ard culminated in the overly broad and ambiguous test for deter-
mining the existence of an agency relationship under FARA. In
enacting FARA, Congress intended to adhere to the Restatement of
Agency by specifically including the element of control in FARA's
definition of agency. 1 3 In United States v. German-American Vo-
cational League,14 the court applied the Restatement standard in
deciding the case." 5 In so doing, the German-American court ap-
plied the basic principles of agency and avoided creating a different
agency relationship which Congress did not intend." 6 If the INAC
court had followed the Restatement standard as set forth in Ger-
man-American, the overly broad and ambiguous informative pur-
poses standard would have been avoided." 7
By returning to the Restatement standard for the determina-
tion of an agency relationship for the purposes of FARA, Congres-
sional intent to adhere to the Restatement would be followed while
confusion would be eliminated.
113. Congressional intent is evidenced by the statutory definition of agent which is
similar to that of the Restatement definition. See supra note 50. Moreover, Congress was
consistent with Restatement principles when it excluded relief groups from FARA because
their foreign beneficiaries would invariably have no control over them. See supra note 52.
The Restatement explains that "[t]here are many relationships in which one acts for the
benefit of another which are to be distinguished from agency by the fact that there is no
control by the beneficiary." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14 comment c (1957).
During the 1966 amendment process, Congress expressed its intent to exempt those
whose activities incidentally benefit a foreign principal. It stated:
[I]t is possible because of the broad scope of the definitions contained in section 1 (c)
to find an agency relationship'. . . of persons who are not, in fact, agents of foreign
principals but whose acts may incidentally be of benefit to foreign interests, even
though such acts are part of the normal exercise of those persons' own rights of free
speech, petition, or assembly. This may have been desirable under conditions which
existed when [FARA] was amended in 1942, but does not appear warranted in
present circumstances.
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT AMENDMENTS, H.R.
REP. No. 1470, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966).
114. 153 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1946). See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
115. 153 F.2d at 864.
116. See supra notes 52, 113 and accompanying text.
117. 668 F.2d at 161. The informative purposes standard is whether the relationship
between a representative and a foreign interest is warranted "to carry out the informative
purposes" of FARA. Id. In INAC, the Irish Northern Aid Committee had already fulfilled the
"informative purposes" of FARA, because it had faithfully registered as an agent of a foreign
principal in 1971. 530 F. Supp. at 245. The "informative purposes" were arguably fulfilled
because defendant informed the govenment that its disclosed principal, the Northern Aid
Committee, was one of the several groups comprising the "Republican Movement" in North-
ern Ireland. See id. at 258. Cf. United States v. German-American Vocational League, 153
F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1945) (defendants conspired to avoid registering under FARA by disguising
their German Reich organization as a social and fraternal club).
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CONCLUSION
The INAC informative purposes standard expanded the inter-
pretation of agency under FARA. By not following the Restatement
definition, this new standard results in a different type of agency
which Congress had not intended to create when it enacted FARA.
Because the informative purposes standard is inherently broad and
ambiguous, it will create confusion among voluntary representa-
tives of foreign interests as to their duty to register under FARA. To
eliminate uncertainty, the traditional Restatement standard of
agency should be the only standard employed when determining
whether an agency exists under FARA. Utilization of the Restate-
ment approach will provide the United States a means for preserv-
ing its national security.
Yuk K. Law
